GE.09-15866 

GENERAL 

A/HRC/12/48 

25 September 2009 

Original:  ENGLISH 

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 

Twelfth session 

Agenda item 7 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER 

OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES 

Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict∗ 

∗ 

 Late submission. 

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PART FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

XXX.  CONCLUSIONS 

A. Concluding observations 

1874. An objective assessment of the events it investigated and their causes and context is 

crucial for the success of any effort to achieve justice for victims of violations and peace 

and security in the region, and as such is in the interest of all concerned and affected by 

this situation, including the parties to the continuing hostilities.  It is in this spirit, and with 

full appreciation of the complexity of its task, that the Mission received and implemented 

its mandate.  

1875. The international community as well as Israel and, to the extent determined by their 

authority and means, Palestinian authorities, have the responsibility to protect victims of 

violations and ensure that they do not continue to suffer the scourge of war or the 

oppression and humiliations of occupation or indiscriminate rocket attacks. People of 

Palestine have the right to freely determine their own political and economic system, 

including the right to resist forcible deprivation of their right to self-determination and the 

right to live, in peace and freedom, in their own State. The people of Israel have the right to 

live in peace and security. Both peoples are entitled to justice in accordance with 

international law. 

1876. In carrying out its mandate, the Mission had regard, as its only guides, for general 

international law, international human rights and humanitarian law, and the obligations 

they place on States, the obligations they place on non-State actors and, above all, the 

rights and entitlements they bestow on individuals. This in no way implies equating the 

position of Israel as the occupying Power with that of the occupied Palestinian population 

or entities representing it. The differences with regard to the power and capacity to inflict 

harm or to protect, including by securing justice when violations occur, are obvious and a 

comparison is neither possible nor necessary. What requires equal attention and effort, 

however, is the protection of all victims in accordance with international law. 

B. The Israeli military operations in Gaza: relevance to and links with Israel’s  

policies vis-à-vis the Occupied Palestinian Territory 

1877. The Mission is of the view that Israel’s military operation in Gaza between 27 

December 2008 and 18 January 2009 and its impact cannot be understood or assessed in 

isolation from developments prior and subsequent to it. The operation fits into a 

continuum of policies aimed at pursuing Israel’s political objectives with regard to Gaza 

and the Occupied Palestinian Territory as a whole. Many such policies are based on or 

result in violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Military 

objectives as stated by the Government of Israel do not explain the facts ascertained by the 

Mission, nor are they congruous with the patterns identified by the Mission during the 

investigation.   

1878. The continuum is evident most immediately with the policy of blockade that 

preceded the operations and that in the Mission’s view amounts to collective punishment 

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intentionally inflicted by the Government of Israel on the people of the Gaza Strip. When 

the operations began, the Gaza Strip had been under a severe regime of closures and 

restrictions on the movement of people, goods and services for almost three years. This 

included basic necessities of life, such as food and medical supplies, and products required 

for the conduct of daily life, such as fuel, electricity, school items, and repair and 

construction material. These measures were imposed by Israel purportedly to isolate and 

weaken Hamas after its electoral victory in view of the perceived continuing threat to 

Israel’s security that it represented. Their effect was compounded by the withholding of 

financial and other assistance by some donors on similar grounds. Adding hardship to the 

already difficult situation in the Gaza Strip, the effects of the prolonged blockade did not 

spare any aspect of the life of Gazans. Prior to the military operation, the Gaza economy 

had been depleted, the health sector beleaguered, the population had been made dependent 

on humanitarian assistance for survival and the conduct of daily life. Men, women and 

children were psychologically suffering from long-standing poverty, insecurity and 

violence, and enforced confinement in a heavily overcrowded territory. The dignity of the 

people of Gaza had been severely eroded. This was the situation in the Gaza Strip when the 

Israeli armed forces launched their offensive in December 2008. The military operations 

and the manner in which they were conducted considerably exacerbated the 

aforementioned effects of the blockade. The result, in a very short time, was unprecedented 

long-term damage both to the people and to their development and recovery prospects.  

1879. An analysis of the modalities and impact of the December-January military 

operations also sets them, in the Mission’s view, in a continuum with a number of other 

pre-existing Israeli policies with regard to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The 

progressive isolation and separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, a policy that 

began much earlier and which was consolidated in particular with the imposition of tight 

closures, restrictions on movement and eventually the blockade, are among the most 

apparent. Several measures adopted by Israel in the West Bank during and following the 

military operations in Gaza also further deepen Israel’s control over the West Bank, 

including East Jerusalem, and point to a convergence of objectives with the Gaza military 

operations. Such measures include increased land expropriation, house demolitions, 

demolition orders and permits to build homes in settlements, greater and more formalized 

access and movement restrictions on Palestinians, new and stricter procedures for 

residents of the Gaza Strip to change their residency to the West Bank. Systematic efforts 

to hinder and control Palestinian self-determined democratic processes, not least through 

the detention of elected political representatives and members of Government and the 

punishment of the Gaza population for its perceived support for Hamas, culminated in the 

attacks on government buildings during the Gaza offensive, most prominently the 

Palestinian Legislative Council. The cumulative impact of these policies and actions make 

prospects for political and economic integration between Gaza and the West Bank more 

remote. 

C. Nature, objectives and targets of the Israeli military operations in Gaza 

1880. Both Palestinians and Israelis whom the Mission met repeatedly stressed that the 

military operations carried out by Israel in Gaza from 27 December 2008 until 18 January 

2009 were qualitatively different from any previous military action by Israel in the 

Occupied Palestinian Territory. Despite the hard conditions that have long been prevailing 

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in the Gaza Strip, victims and long-time observers stated that the operations were 

unprecedented in their severity and that their consequences would be long-lasting.  

1881. When the Mission conducted its first visit to the Gaza Strip in early June 2009, 

almost five months had passed since the end of the Israeli military operations. The 

devastating effects of the operations on the population were, however, unequivocally 

manifest. In addition to the visible destruction of houses, factories, wells, schools, hospitals, 

police stations and other public buildings, the sight of families, including the elderly and 

children, still living amid the rubble of their former dwellings – no reconstruction possible 

due to the continuing blockade – was evidence of the protracted impact of the operations 

on the living conditions of the Gaza population. Reports of the trauma suffered during the 

attacks, the stress due to the uncertainty about the future, the hardship of life and the fear 

of further attacks, pointed to less tangible but not less real long-term effects. 

1882. Women were affected in significant ways. Their situation must be given specific 

attention in any effort to address the consequences of the blockade, of the continuing 

occupation and of the latest Israeli military operations. 

1883. The Gaza military operations were, according to the Israeli Government, thoroughly 

and extensively planned. While the Israeli Government has sought to portray its operations 

as essentially a response to rocket attacks in the exercise of its right to self-defence, the 

Mission considers the plan to have been directed, at least in part, at a different target: the 

people of Gaza as a whole.  

1884. In this respect, the operations were in furtherance of an overall policy aimed at 

punishing the Gaza population for its resilience and for its apparent support for Hamas, 

and possibly with the intent of forcing a change in such support. The Mission considers this 

position to be firmly based in fact, bearing in mind what it saw and heard on the ground, 

what it read in the accounts of soldiers who served in the campaign, and what it heard and 

read from current and former military officers and political leaders whom the Mission 

considers to be representative of the thinking that informed the policy and strategy of the 

military operations. 

1885. The Mission recognizes that the principal focus in the aftermath of military 

operations will often be on the people who have been killed – more than 1,400 in just three 

weeks. This is rightly so. Part of the functions of reports such as this is to attempt, albeit in 

a very small way, to restore the dignity of those whose rights have been violated in the most 

fundamental way of all – the arbitrary deprivation of life. It is important that the 

international community asserts formally and unequivocally that such violence to the most 

basic fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals should not be overlooked and should 

be condemned. 

1886. In this respect, the Mission recognizes that not all deaths constitute violations of 

international humanitarian law. The principle of proportionality acknowledges that, under 

certain strict conditions, actions resulting in the loss of civilian life may not be unlawful. 

What makes the application and assessment of proportionality difficult in respect of many 

of the events investigated by the Mission is that deeds by the Israeli armed forces and 

words of military and political leaders prior to and during the operations indicate that, as a 

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whole, they were premised on a deliberate policy of disproportionate force aimed not at the 

enemy but at the “supporting infrastructure.” In practice, this appears to have meant the 

civilian population. 

1887. The timing of the first Israeli attack, at 11.30 a.m. on a weekday, when children were 

returning from school and the streets of Gaza were crowded with people going about their 

daily business, appears to have been calculated to create the greatest disruption and 

widespread panic among the civilian population. The treatment of many civilians detained 

or even killed while trying to surrender is one manifestation of the way in which the 

effective rules of engagement, standard operating procedures and instructions to the troops 

on the ground appear to have been framed in order to create an environment in which due 

regard for civilian lives and basic human dignity was replaced with disregard for basic 

international humanitarian law and human rights norms.  

1888. The Mission recognizes fully that the Israeli armed forces, like any army attempting 

to act within the parameters of international law, must avoid taking undue risks with their 

soldiers’ lives, but neither can they transfer that risk onto the lives of civilian men, women 

and children. The fundamental principles of distinction and proportionality apply on the 

battlefield, whether that battlefield is a built-up urban area or an open field.  

1889. The repeated failure to distinguish between combatants and civilians appears to the 

Mission to have been the result of deliberate guidance issued to soldiers, as described by 

some of them, and not the result of occasional lapses. 

1890. The Mission recognizes that some of those killed were combatants directly engaged 

in hostilities against Israel, but many were not. The outcome and the modalities of the 

operations indicate, in the Mission’s view, that they were only partially aimed at killing 

leaders and members of Hamas, al-Qassam Brigades and other armed groups. They were 

also to a large degree aimed at destroying or incapacitating civilian property and the 

means of subsistence of the civilian population.  

1891. It is clear from evidence gathered by the Mission that the destruction of food supply 

installations, water sanitation systems, concrete factories and residential houses was the 

result of a deliberate and systematic policy by the Israeli armed forces. It was not carried 

out because those objects presented a military threat or opportunity, but to make the daily 

process of living, and dignified living, more difficult for the civilian population. 

1892. Allied to the systematic destruction of the economic capacity of the Gaza Strip, there 

appears also to have been an assault on the dignity of the people. This was seen not only in 

the use of human shields and unlawful detentions sometimes in unacceptable conditions, 

but also in the vandalizing of houses when occupied and the way in which people were 

treated when their houses were entered. The graffiti on the walls, the obscenities and often 

racist slogans, all constituted an overall image of humiliation and dehumanization of the 

Palestinian population. 

1893. The operations were carefully planned in all their phases. Legal opinions and advice 

were given throughout the planning stages and at certain operational levels during the 

campaign. There were almost no mistakes made according to the Government of Israel. It 

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is in these circumstances that the Mission concludes that what occurred in just over three 

weeks at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 was a deliberately disproportionate 

attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish 

its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an 

ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability. 

1894. The Mission has noted with concern public statements by Israeli officials, including 

senior military officials, to the effect that the use of disproportionate force, attacks on 

civilian population and the destruction of civilian property are legitimate means to achieve 

Israel’s military and political objectives. The Mission believes that such statements not only 

undermine the entire regime of international law, they are inconsistent with the spirit of 

the Charter of the United Nations and, therefore, deserve to be categorically denounced.  

1895. Whatever violations of international humanitarian and human rights law may have 

been committed, the systematic and deliberate nature of the activities described in this 

report leave the Mission in no doubt that responsibility lies in the first place with those who 

designed, planned, ordered and oversaw the operations. 

D. Occupation, resilience and civil society 

1896. The accounts of more severe violence during the recent military operations did not 

obscure the fact that the concept of “normalcy” in the Gaza Strip has long been redefined 

owing to the protracted situation of abuse and lack of protection deriving from the 

decades-long occupation. 

1897. As the Mission focused on investigating and analysing the specific matters within its 

mandate, Israel’s continuing occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank emerged as 

the fundamental factor underlying violations of international humanitarian and human 

rights law against the protected population and undermining prospects for development 

and peace. Israel’s failure to acknowledge and exercise its responsibilities as the occupying 

Power further exacerbated the effects of occupation on the Palestinian people, and continue 

to do so. Furthermore, the harsh and unlawful practices of occupation, far from quelling 

resistance, breed it, including its violent manifestations. The Mission is of the view that 

ending occupation is a prerequisite for the return of a dignified life for Palestinians, as well 

as development and a peaceful solution to the conflict. 

1898. The Mission was struck by the resilience and dignity shown by people in the face of 

dire circumstances. UNRWA Director of Operations, John Ging, relayed to the Mission the 

answer of a Gaza teacher during a discussion after the end of the Israeli military 

operations about strengthening human rights education in schools. Rather than expressing 

scepticism at the relevance of teaching human rights in a context of renewed denial of 

rights, the teacher unhesitantly supported the resumption of human rights education: 

“This is a war of values, and we are not going to lose it”. 

1899. The assiduous work of Palestinian non-governmental and civil society organizations 

in providing support to the population in such extreme circumstances, and in giving voice 

to the suffering and expectations of victims of violations deserves to be fully acknowledged. 

Their role in helping to sustain the resilience and dignity of the population cannot be 

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overstated. The Mission heard many accounts of NGO workers, doctors, ambulance 

drivers, journalists, human rights monitors, who, at the height of the military operations, 

risked their lives to be of service to people in need. They frequently relayed the anxiety of 

having to choose between remaining close to their own families or continuing to work to 

assist others in need, thereby often being cut off from news about the safety or whereabouts 

of family members. The Mission wishes to pay tribute to the courage and work of the 

numerous individuals who so contributed to alleviating the suffering of the population and 

to report on the events in Gaza. 

E. Rocket and mortar attacks in Israel 

1900. Palestinian armed groups have launched thousands of rockets and mortars into 

Israel since April 2001. These have succeeded in causing terror within Israel’s civilian 

population, as evidenced by the high rates of psychological trauma within the affected 

communities. The attacks have also led to an erosion of the social, cultural and economic 

lives of the communities in southern Israel, and have affected the rights to education of the 

tens of thousands of children and young adults who attend classes in the affected areas. 

1901. Between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, these attacks left four people dead 

and hundreds injured. That there have not been more casualties is due to a combination of 

luck and measures taken by the Israeli Government, including the fortification of public 

buildings, the construction of shelters and, in times of escalated hostilities, the closure of 

schools.  

1902. The Mission notes, with concern, that Israel has not provided the same level of 

protection from rockets and mortars to affected Palestinian citizens as it has to Jewish 

citizens. In particular, it has failed to provide public shelters or fortification of schools, for 

example, to the Palestinian communities living in the unrecognized villages and some of the 

recognized villages. It ought to go without saying that the thousands of Palestinian Israelis– 

including a significant number of children – who live within the range of rocket fire, 

deserve the same protection as the Israeli Government provides to its Jewish citizens. 

F. Dissenting voices in Israel 

1903. While the Israeli military offensive in Gaza was widely supported by the Israeli 

public, there were also dissenting voices, which expressed themselves through 

demonstrations, protests, as well as public reporting on Israel’s conduct. The Mission is of 

the view that actions of the Israeli Government during and following the military 

operations in the Gaza Strip, including interrogation of political activists, repression of 

criticism and sources of potential criticism of Israeli military actions, in particular NGOs, 

have contributed significantly to a political climate in which dissent with the Government 

and its actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is not tolerated. The denial of media 

access to Gaza and the continuing denial of access to human rights monitors are, in the 

Mission’s view, an attempt both to remove the Government’s actions in the Occupied 

Palestinian Territory from public scrutiny and to impede investigations and reporting of 

the conduct of the parties to the conflict in the Gaza Strip.  

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1904. In this context of increased intolerance for dissenting opinions in Israel, the Mission 

wishes to acknowledge the difficult work of NGOs in Israel, which courageously continue 

to express criticism of Government action that violates international human rights and 

humanitarian law. The work of these organizations is essential not only to ensure 

independent information to the Israeli and international public, but also to encourage a 

facts-based debate about these issues within Israeli society.   

G. The impact of dehumanization 

1905. As in many conflicts, one of the features of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the 

dehumanization of the other, and of victims in particular. Palestinian psychiatrist Dr. Iyad 

al-Sarraj explained the cycle of aggression and victimization through which “the 

Palestinian in the eyes of the Israeli soldier is not an equal human being. Sometimes […] 

even becomes a demon […]” This “culture of demonization and dehumanization” adds to a 

state of paranoia. “Paranoia has two sides, the side of victimization, I am a victim of this 

world, the whole world is against me and on the other side, I am superior to this world and 

I can oppress it. This leads to what is called the arrogance of power.” As Palestinians, “we 

look in general to the Israelis as demons and that we can hate them, that what we do is a 

reaction, and we say that the Israelis can only understand the language of power. The same 

thing that we say about the Israelis they say about us, that we only understand the 

language of violence or force. There we see the arrogance of power and [the Israeli] uses it 

without thinking of humanity at all. In my view we are seeing not only a state of war but 

also a state that is cultural and psychological and I hope, I wish that the Israelis would 

start, and there are many, many Jews in the world and in Israel that look into themselves, 

have an insight that would make them, alleviate the fear that they have because there’s a 

state of fear in Israel, in spite of all the power, and that they would start to walk on the 

road of dealing with the consequences of their own victimization and to start dealing with 

the Palestinian as a human being, a full human being who’s equal in rights with the Israeli 

and also the other way around, the Palestinian must deal with himself, must respect himself 

and respect his own differences in order to be able to stand before the Israeli also as a full 

human being with equal rights and obligations. This is the real road for justice and for 

peace.” 

1906. Israeli college teacher Ofer Shinar offered a similar analysis: “Israeli society’s 

problem is that, because of the conflict, Israeli society feels itself to be a victim and to a 

large extent that’s justified and it’s very difficult for Israeli society to move and to feel that 

it can also see the other side and to understand that the other side is also a victim. This I 

think is the greatest tragedy of the conflict and it’s terribly difficult to overcome it […] I 

think that the initiative that you’ve taken in listening to […] people […] is very important. 

The message that you’re giving Israeli society is absolutely unambiguous that you are 

impartial that you should be able to see that the feeling of being a victim is something that 

characterizes both sides. What requires you to take this responsibility is the fact that you 

have to understand how difficult it is to get this message through to Israeli society, how 

closed the Israeli society is, how difficult it is for Israeli society to understand that the other 

side is not just the party which is infringing our own human rights, but how they are 

having their human rights infringed, how they are suffering as well.” 

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1907. The Mission, in fulfilling its mandate to investigate alleged violations of international 

law that occurred in the context of the December 2008 – January 2009 military operations 

in Gaza, spoke predominantly to those most affected by the most recent events in a conflict 

that has spanned decades. As may be expected, the Mission found societies scarred by 

living in conflict with significant psychological trauma stemming from a life that may 

rightly seem to those living in more peaceful countries to be unbearable.  

1908. Both the Palestinians and the Israelis are legitimately angered at the lives that they 

are forced to lead. For the Palestinians, the anger about individual events – the civilian 

casualties, injuries and destruction in Gaza following from military attacks, the blockade, 

the continued construction of the Wall outside of the 1967 borders – feed into an 

underlying anger about the continuing Israeli occupation, its daily humiliations and their 

as-yet-unfulfilled right to self-determination. For the Israelis, the public statements of 

Palestinian armed groups celebrating rocket and mortar attacks on civilians strengthen a 

deep-rooted concern that negotiation will yield little and that their nation remains under 

existential threat from which only it can protect its people. In this way, both the Israelis 

and the Palestinians share a secret fear – for some, a belief – that each has no intention of 

accepting the other’s right to a country of their own. This anger and fear are unfortunately 

ably represented by many politicians. 

1909. Some Israelis pointed out to the Mission that policies of the Israeli Government 

relating to the isolation of the Gaza Strip and the tighter restrictions on the movement of 

Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory and between the Occupied 

Palestinian Territory and Israel, have contributed to increasing the distance between 

Palestinians and Israelis, reducing the opportunities to interact other than in situations of 

control and coercion such as checkpoints and military posts. 

1910. In this context, the Mission was encouraged by reports of exchange and cooperation 

between Palestinians and Israelis, for example with regard to mental health specialists 

working with Palestinians from Gaza and southern Israel’s communities, and with regard 

to cooperation between Magen David Adom and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, 

especially in the West Bank, as they fulfil a shared commitment to providing humanitarian 

assistance to the communities in which they work, regardless of the ethnicity of the patient 

who lies before them. 

H. The intra-Palestinian situation 

1911. The division and violence between Fatah and Hamas, which culminated in the 

establishment of parallel governance entities and structures in the Gaza Strip and the West 

Bank, is having adverse consequences for the human rights of the Palestinian population in 

both areas, as well as contributing to erode the rule of law in the Occupied Palestinian 

Territory in addition to the threats already linked to foreign occupation. Even with the 

narrow focus of the Mission on violations relevant to the context of the December-January 

military operations, the diminishing protections for Palestinians are evident from the cases 

of arbitrary deprivation of life, arbitrary detention of political activists or sympathizers, 

limitations on freedom of expression and association, and abuses by security forces. The 

situation is compounded by the ever reducing role of the judiciary in ensuring the rule of 

law and legal remedies for violations. A resolution of the internal divisions based on the 

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free will and decisions of Palestinians and without external interference would strengthen 

the ability of Palestinian authorities and institutions to protect the rights of the people 

under their responsibility. 

I. The need for protection and the role of the international community 

1912. International law sets obligations on States not only to respect but also to ensure 

respect for international humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice stated in its 

Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 

Palestinian Territory that “all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to 

the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the 

obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure 

compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that 

Convention". 

1913. The 2005 World Summit Outcome document recognized that the international 

community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 

diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and 

VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from, inter alia, war crimes and crimes 

against humanity. The document stressed that the Members of the United Nations are 

prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 

Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII should peaceful means be 

inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from 

genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 2009, the 

Secretary-General, in his report on implementing the responsibility to protect, noted that 

the enumeration of these crimes did not  “detract in any way from the much broader range 

of obligations existing under international humanitarian law, international human rights 

law, refugee law and international criminal law.”   

1914. After decades of sustained conflict, the level of threat to which both Palestinians and 

Israelis are subjected has not abated, but if anything increased with continued escalations 

of violence, death and suffering for the civilian population, of which the December-January 

military operations in Gaza are only the most recent occurrence. Israel is therefore also 

failing to protect its own citizens by refusing to acknowledge the futility of resorting to 

violent means and military power. 

1915. Israeli incursions and military actions in the Gaza Strip did not stop after the end of 

the military operations of December – January. 

1916. The Security Council has placed the protection of civilian populations on its agenda 

as a regular item, recognizing it as a matter falling within its responsibility. The Mission 

notes that the international community has been largely silent and has to date failed to act 

to ensure the protection of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip and generally the 

Occupied Palestinian Territory. Suffice it to notice the lack of adequate reaction to the 

blockade and its consequences, to the Gaza military operations and, in their aftermath, to 

the continuing obstacles to reconstruction. The Mission also considers that the isolation of 

the Gaza authorities and the sanctions against the Gaza Strip have had a negative impact 

on the protection of the population. Immediate action to enable reconstruction in Gaza is 

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no doubt required. However, it also needs to be accompanied by a firmer and principled 

stance by the international community on violations of international humanitarian and 

human rights law and long delayed action to end them. Protection of civilian populations 

requires respect for international law and accountability for violations. When the 

international community does not live up to its own legal standards, the threat to the 

international rule of law is obvious and potentially far-reaching in its consequences. 

1917. The Mission acknowledges and emphasizes the impressive and essential role played 

by the staff of the numerous United Nations agencies and bodies working to assist the 

population of the Occupied Palestinian Territory in all aspects of daily life. An additional 

disturbing feature of the December-January military operations was the disregard in 

several incidents, some of which are documented in this report, for the inviolability of 

United Nations premises, facilities and staff. It ought to go without saying that attacks on 

the United Nations are unacceptable and undermine its ability to fulfil its protection and 

assistance role vis-à-vis a population that so badly needs it. 

J. Summary of legal findings 

1918. Detailed legal findings by the Mission are included in each of the chapters of the 

report where specific facts and events are analysed. The following is a summary of those 

findings. 

1. Actions by Israel in Gaza in the context of the military operations  

of 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009 

(a) Precautions in launching attacks 

1919. The Mission finds that in a number of cases Israel failed to take feasible precautions 

required by customary law reflected in article 57 (2) (a) (ii) of Additional Protocol I to 

avoid or minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian 

objects. The firing of white phosphorus shells over the UNRWA compound in Gaza City is 

one of such cases in which precautions were not taken in the choice of weapons and 

methods in the attack, and these facts were compounded by reckless disregard for the 

consequences. The intentional strike at al-Quds hospital using high-explosive artillery 

shells and white phosphorous in and around the hospital also violated articles 18 and 19 of 

the Fourth Geneva Convention. With regard to the attack against al-Wafa hospital, the 

Mission found a violation of the same provisions, as well as a violation of the customary law 

prohibition against attacks which may be expected to cause excessive damage to civilians 

and civilian objects.  

1920. The Mission finds that the different kinds of warnings issued by Israel in Gaza 

cannot be considered as sufficiently effective in the circumstances to comply with 

customary law as reflected in Additional Protocol I, article 57 (2) (c). While some of the 

leaflet warnings were specific in nature, the Mission does not consider that general 

messages telling people to leave wherever they were and go to city centres, in the particular 

circumstances of the military campaign, meet the threshold of effectiveness. Firing missiles 

into or on top of buildings as a “warning” is essentially a dangerous practice and a form of 

attack rather than a warning.  

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(b) Incidents involving the killing of civilians 

1921. The Mission found numerous instances of deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian 

objects (individuals, whole families, houses, mosques) in violation of the fundamental 

international humanitarian law principle of distinction, resulting in deaths and serious 

injuries. In these cases the Mission found that the protected status of civilians was not 

respected and the attacks were intentional, in clear violation of customary law reflected in 

article 51 (2) and 75 of Additional Protocol I, article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 

and articles 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In some 

cases the Mission additionally concluded that the attack was also launched with the 

intention of spreading terror among the civilian population. Moreover, in several of the 

incidents investigated, the Israeli armed forces not only did not use their best efforts to 

permit humanitarian organizations access to the wounded and medical relief, as required 

by customary international law reflected in article 10 (2) of Additional Protocol I, but they 

arbitrarily withheld such access.  

1922. With regard to one incident investigated, involving the death of at least 35 

Palestinians, the Mission finds that the Israeli armed forces launched an attack which a 

reasonable commander would have expected to cause excessive loss of civilian life in 

relation to the military advantage sought, in violation of customary international 

humanitarian law as reflected in Additional Protocol I, articles 57 (2) (a) (ii) and (iii). The 

Mission finds a violation of the right to life (ICCPR, article 6) of the civilians killed in this 

incident. 

1923. The Mission also concludes that Israel, by deliberately attacking police stations and 

killing large numbers of policemen (99 in the incidents investigated by the Mission) during 

the first minutes of the military operations, failed to respect the principle of proportionality 

between the military advantage anticipated by killing some policemen who might have 

been members of Palestinian armed groups and the loss of civilian life (the majority of 

policemen and members of the public present in the police stations or nearby during the 

attack). Therefore, these were disproportionate attacks in violation of customary 

international law. The Mission finds a violation of the right to life (ICCPR, article 6) of the 

policemen killed in these attacks who were not members of Palestinian armed groups. 

(c) Certain weapons used by the Israeli armed forces 

1924. In relation to the weapons used by the Israeli armed forces during military 

operations, the Mission accepts that white phosphorous, flechettes and heavy metal (such 

as tungsten) are not currently proscribed under international law. Their use is, however, 

restricted or even prohibited in certain circumstances by virtue of the principles of 

proportionality and precautions necessary in the attack. Flechettes, as an area weapon, are 

particularly unsuitable for use in urban settings, while, in the Mission's view, the use of 

white phosphorous as an obscurant at least should be banned because of the number and 

variety of hazards that attach to the use of such a pyrophoric chemical. 

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(d) Treatment of Palestinians in the hands of the Israeli armed forces 

(i) Use of human shields   

1925. The Mission investigated several incidents in which the Israeli armed forces used 

local Palestinian residents to enter houses which might be booby-trapped or harbour 

enemy combatants (this practice, known in the West Bank as “neighbour procedure”, was 

called “Johnnie procedure” during the military operations in Gaza). The Mission found 

that the practice constitutes the use of human shields prohibited by international 

humanitarian law. It further constitutes a violation of the right to life, protected in article 6 

of ICCPR, and of the prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment in its article 7.  

1926. The questioning of Palestinian civilians under threat of death or injury to extract 

information about Hamas and Palestinian combatants and tunnels constitutes a violation of 

article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits physical or moral coercion 

against protected persons.  

(ii) Detention 

1927. The Mission found that the Israeli armed forces in Gaza rounded up and detained 

large groups of persons protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Mission finds 

that their detention cannot be justified either as detention of “unlawful combatants” or as 

internment of civilians for imperative reasons of security. The Mission considers that the 

severe beatings, constant humiliating and degrading treatment and detention in foul 

conditions allegedly suffered by individuals in the Gaza Strip under the control of the 

Israeli armed forces and in detention in Israel, constitute a failure to treat protected 

persons humanely in violation of article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as well as 

violations of articles 7 and 10 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 

regarding torture and the treatment of persons in detention, and of its article 14 with 

regard to due process guarantees. The treatment of women during detention was contrary 

to the special respect for women required under customary law as reflected in the article 76 

of Additional Protocol I. The Mission finds that the rounding-up of large groups of civilians 

and their prolonged detention under the circumstances described in this report constitute a 

collective penalty on those persons in violation of article 33 of the Fourth Geneva 

Convention and article 50 of the Hague Regulations. Such treatment amounts to measures 

of intimidation or terror prohibited by article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 

(e) Destruction of property 

1928. The Mission finds that the attacks against the Palestinian Legislative Council 

building and the main prison in Gaza constituted deliberate attacks on civilian objects in 

violation of the rule of customary international humanitarian law whereby attacks must be 

strictly limited to military objectives. 

1929. The Mission also finds that the Israeli armed forces unlawfully and wantonly 

attacked and destroyed without military necessity a number of food production or food- 

processing objects and facilities (including mills, land and greenhouses), drinking-water 

installations, farms and animals in violation of the principle of distinction. From the facts 

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ascertained by it, the Mission finds that this destruction was carried out with the purpose 

of denying sustenance to the civilian population, in violation of customary law reflected in 

article 54 (2) of the First Additional Protocol. The Mission further concludes that the 

Israeli armed forces carried out widespread destruction of private residential houses, water 

wells and water tanks unlawfully and wantonly.   

1930. In addition to being violations of international humanitarian law, these extensive 

wanton acts of destruction amount to violations of Israel’s duties to respect the right to an 

adequate standard of living of the people in the Gaza Strip, which includes the rights to 

food, water and housing, as well as the right to the highest attainable standard of health, 

protected under articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 

Cultural Rights.  

(f) Impact of the blockade and the military operations on the Gaza population 

1931. The Mission concludes that the blockade policies implemented by Israel against the 

Gaza Strip, in particular the closure of or restrictions imposed on border crossings in the 

immediate period before the military operations, subjected the local population to extreme 

hardship and deprivations that amounted to a violation of Israel’s obligations as an 

occupying Power under the Fourth Geneva Convention. These measures led to a severe 

deterioration and regression in the levels of realization of economic and social rights of 

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and weakened its social and economic fabric, leaving health, 

education, sanitation and other essential services in a very vulnerable position to cope with 

the immediate effects of the military operations.  

1932. The Mission finds that, despite the information circulated by Israel about the 

humanitarian relief schemes in place during the military operations, Israel has essentially 

violated its obligation to allow free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital 

objects, food and clothing that were needed to meet the urgent humanitarian needs of the 

civilian population in the context of the military operations, which is in violation of article 

23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 

1933. In addition to the above general findings, the Mission also considers that Israel has 

violated its specific obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, including 

the rights to peace and security, free movement, livelihood and health.  

1934. The Mission concludes that the conditions resulting from deliberate actions of the 

Israeli armed forces and the declared policies of the Government with regard to the Gaza 

Strip before, during and after the military operation cumulatively indicate the intention to 

inflict collective punishment on the people of the Gaza Strip. The Mission, therefore, finds 

a violation of the provisions of article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.  

(g) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and acts raising individual criminal 

responsibility under international criminal law 

1935. From the facts gathered, the Mission found that the following grave breaches of the 

Fourth Geneva Convention were committed by the Israeli armed forces in Gaza: wilful 

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killing, torture or inhuman treatment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to 

body or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity 

and carried out unlawfully and wantonly. As grave breaches these acts give rise to 

individual criminal responsibility. The Mission notes that the use of human shields also 

constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 

1936. The Mission further considers that the series of acts that deprive Palestinians in the 

Gaza Strip of their means of subsistence, employment, housing and water, that deny their 

freedom of movement and their right to leave and enter their own country, that limit their 

rights to access a court of law and an effective remedy, could lead a competent court to find 

that the crime of persecution, a crime against humanity, has been committed.  

2. Actions by Israel in the West Bank in the context of the military operations  

in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009 

(a) Treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank by Israeli security forces, including use 

of excessive or lethal force during demonstrations 

1937. With regard to acts of violence by settlers against Palestinians, the Mission concludes 

that Israel has failed to fulfil its international obligations to protect the Palestinians from 

violence by private individuals under both international human rights law and 

international humanitarian law. In some instances security forces acquiesced to the acts of 

violence in violation of the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 

When this acquiescence occurs only in respect of violence against Palestinians by settlers 

and not vice versa, it would amount to discrimination on the basis of national origin, 

prohibited under ICCPR.    

1938. Israel also violated a series of human rights by unlawfully repressing peaceful public 

demonstrations and using excessive force against demonstrators. The use of firearms, 

including live ammunitions, and the use of snipers resulting in the death of demonstrators 

are a violation of article 6 of ICCPR as an arbitrary deprivation of life and, in the 

circumstances examined by the Mission, appear to indicate an intention or at least a 

recklessness towards causing harm to civilians which may amount to wilful killing. 

1939. Excessive use of force that resulted in injury rather than death constitutes violations 

of a number of standards, including articles 7 and 9 of ICCPR. These violations are 

compounded by the seemingly discriminatory “open fire regulations” for security forces 

dealing with demonstrations, based on the presence of persons with a particular 

nationality, violating the principle of non-discrimination in ICCPR (art. 2) as well as under 

article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.   

1940. The Mission finds that Israel failed to investigate, and when appropriate prosecute, 

acts by its agents or by third parties involving serious violations of international 

humanitarian law and human rights law. 

1941. The Mission was alarmed at the reported increase in settler violence in the past year 

and the failure of the Israeli security forces to prevent settlers’ attacks against Palestinian 

civilians and their property. These are accompanied by a series of violations by Israeli 

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forces or acquiesced by them, including the removal of residential status from Palestinians, 

which could eventually lead to a situation of virtual deportation and entail additional 

violations of other rights. 

(b) Detention of Palestinians by Israel 

1942. The Mission analysed information it received on the detention of Palestinians in 

Israeli prisons during or in the context of the military operations of December 2008– 

January 2009 and found those practices generally inconsistent with human rights and 

international humanitarian law. The military court system to which Palestinians from the 

Occupied Palestinian Territory are subjected deprives them of due process guarantees in 

keeping with international law. 

1943. The Mission finds that the detention of members of the Palestinian Legislative 

Council by Israel violates the right not to be arbitrarily detained, as protected by article 9 

of ICCPR. Insofar as it is based on political affiliation and prevents those members from 

participating in the conduct of public affairs, it is also in violation of its articles 25 

recognizing the right to take part in public affairs and 26, which provides for the right to 

equal protection under the law. Insofar as their detention is unrelated to their individual 

behaviour, it constitutes collective punishment, prohibited by article 33 of the Fourth 

Geneva Convention. Information on the detention of large numbers of children and their 

treatment by Israeli security forces point to violations of their rights under ICCPR and the 

Convention on the Rights of the Child. 

(c) Violations of the right to free movement and access  

1944. The Mission finds that the extensive restrictions imposed by Israel on the movement 

and access of Palestinians in the West Bank are disproportionate to any legitimate 

objective served and in violation of article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and article 

12 of ICCPR, guaranteeing freedom of movement.  

1945. Where checkpoints become a site of humiliation of the protected population by 

military or civilian operators, this may entail a violation of the customary law rule reflected 

in article 75 (2) (b) of Additional Protocol I. 

1946. The continued construction of settlements in occupied territory constitutes a 

violation of article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The extensive destruction and 

appropriation of property, including land confiscation and house demolitions in the West 

Bank, including East Jerusalem, not justified by military necessity and carried out 

unlawfully and wantonly, amounts to a grave breach under article 147 of the Fourth 

Geneva Convention. 

1947. Insofar as movement and access restrictions, the settlements and their 

infrastructure, demographic policies vis-à-vis Jerusalem and “Area C” of the West Bank, 

as well as the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, prevent a viable, contiguous and 

sovereign Palestinian State from arising, they are in violation of the jus cogens right to self- 

determination.  

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3. Actions by Israel in Israel 

1948. In relation to alleged violations within Israel, the Mission concludes that, although 

there does not appear to be a policy in this respect, there were occasions when reportedly 

the authorities placed obstacles in the way of protesters seeking to exercise their right to 

peaceful assembly and freedom of speech to criticize Israel’s military actions in the Gaza 

Strip. These rights are protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights. Instances of physical violence against protesters and other humiliations, not rising 

to the level of physical violence, of the protesters by the police violated Israel’s obligations 

under article 10 of the Covenant. The Mission is also concerned about activists being 

compelled to attend interviews with the General Security Services (Shabak), which 

reportedly creates an atmosphere intolerant of dissent within Israel. Hostile retaliatory 

actions against civil society organizations by the Government of Israel for criticisms of the 

Israeli authorities and for exposing alleged violations of international human rights law 

and international humanitarian law during the military operations are inconsistent with 

the Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of 

Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental 

Freedoms. 

1949. The Mission finds that the imposition of a near blanket exclusion of the media and 

human rights monitors from Gaza since 5 November 2008 and throughout the operations is 

inconsistent with Israel’s obligations with regard to the right to access to information.   

4. Actions by Palestinian armed groups 

1950. In relation to the firing of rockets and mortars into southern Israel by Palestinian 

armed groups operating in the Gaza Strip, the Mission finds that the Palestinian armed 

groups fail to distinguish between military targets and the civilian population and civilian 

objects in southern Israel. The launching of rockets and mortars which cannot be aimed 

with sufficient precisions at military targets breaches the fundamental principle of 

distinction. Where there is no intended military target and the rockets and mortars are 

launched into civilian areas, they constitute a deliberate attack against the civilian 

population. These actions would constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against 

humanity. 

1951. The Mission concludes that the rocket and mortars attacks, launched by Palestinian 

armed groups operating from Gaza, have caused terror in the affected communities of 

southern Israel. The attacks have caused loss of life and physical and mental injury to 

civilians as well as damaging private houses, religious buildings and property, and eroded 

the economic and cultural life of the affected communities and severely affected economic 

and social rights of the population. 

1952. With regard to the continuing detention of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, the Mission 

finds that, as a soldier who belongs to the Israeli armed forces and who was captured 

during an enemy incursion into Israel, Gilad Shalit meets the requirements for prisoner-of- 

war status under the Third Geneva Convention and should be protected, treated humanely 

and be allowed external communication as appropriate according to that Convention.   

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1953. The Mission also examined whether the Palestinian armed groups complied with 

their obligations under international humanitarian law to take constant care to minimize 

the risk of harm to the civilian population in Gaza among whom the hostilities were being 

conducted. The conduct of hostilities in built-up areas does not, of itself, constitute a 

violation of international law. However, launching attacks – whether of rockets and 

mortars at the population of southern Israel or at the Israeli armed forces inside Gaza – 

close to civilian or protected buildings constitutes a failure to take all feasible precautions. 

In cases where this occurred, the Palestinian armed groups would have unnecessarily 

exposed the civilian population of Gaza to the inherent dangers of the military operations 

taking place around them. The Mission found no evidence to suggest that Palestinian 

armed groups either directed civilians to areas where attacks were being launched or that 

they forced civilians to remain within the vicinity of the attacks. The Mission also found no 

evidence that members of Palestinian armed groups engaged in combat in civilian dress. 

Although in the one incident of an Israeli attack on a mosque it investigated the Mission 

found that there was no indication that that mosque was used for military purposes or to 

shield military activities, the Mission cannot exclude that this might have occurred in other 

cases.  

5. Actions by responsible Palestinian authorities 

1954. Although the Gaza authorities deny any control over armed groups and 

responsibility for their acts, in the Mission’s view, if they failed to take the necessary 

measures to prevent the Palestinian armed groups from endangering the civilian 

population, the Gaza authorities would bear responsibility for the damage arising to the 

civilians living in Gaza.  

1955. The Mission finds that security services under the control of the Gaza authorities 

carried out extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests, detentions and ill-treatment of 

people, in particular political opponents, which constitute serious violations of the human 

rights to life, to liberty and security of the person, to freedom from torture or cruel, 

inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to be protected against arbitrary arrest 

and detention, to a fair and impartial legal proceeding; and to freedom of opinion and 

expression, including freedom to hold opinions without interference.  

1956. The Mission also concludes that the Palestinian Authority’s actions against political 

opponents in the West Bank, which started in January 2006 and intensified during the 

period between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, constitute violations of human 

rights and of the Palestinians’ own Basic Law. Detentions on political grounds violate the 

rights to liberty and security of person, to a fair trial and the right not to be discriminated 

against on the basis of one’s political opinion, which are all part of customary international 

law. Reports of torture and other forms of ill-treatment during arrest and detention and of 

death in detention require prompt investigation and accountability.  

K.  The need for accountability 

1957. The Mission was struck by the repeated comment of Palestinian victims, human 

rights defenders, civil society interlocutors and officials that they hoped that this would be 

the last investigative mission of its kind, because action for justice would follow from it. It 

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was struck, as well, by the comment that every time a report is published and no action 

follows, this “emboldens Israel and her conviction of being untouchable”. To deny modes of 

accountability reinforces impunity, and tarnishes the credibility of the United Nations and 

of the international community. The Mission believes these comments ought to be at the 

forefront in the consideration by Members States and United Nations bodies of its findings 

and recommendations and action consequent upon them. 

1958. The Mission is firmly convinced that justice and respect for the rule of law are the 

indispensable basis for peace. The prolonged situation of impunity has created a justice 

crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory that warrants action.  

1959. After reviewing Israel’s system of investigation and prosecution of serious violations 

of human rights and humanitarian law, in particular of suspected war crimes and crimes 

against humanity, the Mission found major structural flaws that, in its view, make the 

system inconsistent with international standards. With military “operational debriefings” 

at the core of the system, there is no effective and impartial investigation mechanism and 

victims of such alleged violations are deprived of any effective or prompt remedy. 

Furthermore, such investigations, being internal to the Israeli military authority, do not 

comply with international standards of independence and impartiality. The Mission 

believes that the few investigations conducted by the Israeli authorities on alleged serious 

violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and, in particular, alleged 

war crimes, in the context of the military operations in Gaza between 27 December 2008 

and 18 January 2009, are affected by the defects in the system, have been unduly delayed 

despite the gravity of the allegations, and, therefore, lack the required credibility and 

conformity with international standards. The Mission is concerned that investigations of 

relatively less serious violations that the Government of Israel claims to be investigating 

have also been unduly protracted.  

1960. The Mission noted the pattern of delays, inaction or otherwise unsatisfactory 

handling by Israeli authorities of investigations, prosecutions and convictions of military 

personnel and settlers for violence and offences against Palestinians, including in the West 

Bank, as well as their discriminatory outcome. Additionally, the current constitutional and 

legal framework in Israel provides very few possibilities, if any, for Palestinians to seek 

compensation and reparations. 

1961. In the light of the information it reviewed and its analysis, the Mission concludes that 

there are serious doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out genuine investigations 

in an impartial, independent, prompt and effective way as required by international law. 

The Mission is also of the view that the system presents inherently discriminatory features 

that make the pursuit of justice for Palestinian victims extremely difficult. 

1962. With regard to allegations of violations of international humanitarian law falling 

within the jurisdiction of responsible Palestinian authorities in Gaza, the Mission finds that 

these allegations have not been investigated.  

1963. The Mission notes that the responsibility to investigate violations of international 

human rights and humanitarian law, prosecute if appropriate and try perpetrators belongs 

in the first place to domestic authorities and institutions. This is a legal obligation 

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incumbent on States and State-like entities. However, where domestic authorities are 

unable or unwilling to comply with this obligation, international justice mechanisms must 

be activated to prevent impunity.  

1964. The Mission believes that, in the circumstances, there is little potential for 

accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law 

through domestic institutions in Israel and even less in Gaza. The Mission is of the view 

that long-standing impunity has been a key factor in the perpetuation of violence in the 

region and in the reoccurrence of violations, as well as in the erosion of confidence among 

Palestinians and many Israelis concerning prospects for justice and a peaceful solution to 

the conflict. 

1965. The Mission considers that several of the violations referred to in this report amount 

to grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention. It notes that there is a duty imposed 

by the Geneva Conventions on all high contracting parties to search for and bring before 

their courts those responsible for the alleged violations. 

1966. The Mission considers that the serious violations of international humanitarian law 

recounted in this report fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the International 

Criminal Court. The Mission notes that the United Nations Security Council has long 

recognized the impact of the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian 

question, on international peace and security, and that it regularly considers and reviews 

this situation. The Mission is persuaded that, in the light of the long-standing nature of the 

conflict, the frequent and consistent allegations of violations of international humanitarian 

law against all parties, the apparent increase in intensity of such violations in the recent 

military operations, and the regrettable possibility of a return to further violence, 

meaningful and practical steps to end impunity for such violations would offer an effective 

way to deter such violations recurring in the future. The Mission is of the view that the 

prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 

would contribute to ending such violations, to the protection of civilians and to the 

restoration and maintenance of peace. 

XXXI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 

1967. The Mission makes the following recommendations related to: 

(a) Accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law; 

(b) Reparations; 

(c) Serious violations of human rights law; 

(d) The blockade and reconstruction; 

(e) The use of weapons and military procedures; 

(f) The protection of human rights organizations and defenders;   

(g) Follow-up to the Mission’s recommendations. 

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1968. To the Human Rights Council, 

(a) The Mission recommends that the United Nations Human Rights Council 

should endorse the recommendations contained in this report, take appropriate action to 

implement them as recommended by the Mission and through other means as it may deem 

appropriate, and continue to review their implementation in future sessions; 

(b) In view of the gravity of the violations of international human rights and 

humanitarian law and possible war crimes and crimes against humanity that it has 

reported, the Mission recommends that the United Nations Human Rights Council should 

request the United Nations Secretary-General to bring this report to the attention of the 

United Nations Security Council under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations so 

that the Security Council may consider action according to the Mission’s relevant 

recommendations below; 

(c) The Mission further recommends that the United Nations Human Rights 

Council should formally submit this report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 

Court; 

(d) The Mission recommends that the Human Rights Council should submit this 

report to the General Assembly with a request that it should be considered;   

(e) The Mission recommends that the Human Rights Council should bring the 

Mission’s recommendations to the attention of the relevant United Nations human rights 

treaty bodies so that they may include review of progress in their implementation, as may 

be relevant to their mandate and procedures, in their periodic review of compliance by 

Israel with its human rights obligations. The Mission further recommends that the Human 

Rights Council should consider review of progress as part of its universal periodic review 

process.  

1969. To the United Nations Security Council, 

(a) The Mission recommends that the Security Council should require the 

Government of Israel, under Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations: 

(i) To take all appropriate steps, within a period of three months, to launch 

appropriate investigations that are independent and in conformity with 

international standards, into the serious violations of international 

humanitarian and international human rights law reported by the 

Mission and any other serious allegations that might come to its attention; 

(ii) To inform the Security Council, within a further period of three months, 

of actions taken, or in process of being taken, by the Government of Israel 

to inquire into, investigate and prosecute such serious violations; 

(b) The Mission further recommends that the Security Council should at the same 

time establish an independent committee of experts in international humanitarian and 

human rights law to monitor and report on any domestic legal or other proceedings 

undertaken by the Government of Israel in relation to the aforesaid investigations. Such 

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committee of experts should report at the end of the six-month period to the Security 

Council on its assessment of relevant domestic proceedings initiated by the Government of 

Israel, including their progress, effectiveness and genuineness, so that the Security Council 

may assess whether appropriate action to ensure justice for victims and accountability for 

perpetrators has been or is being taken at the domestic level. The Security Council should 

request the committee to report to it at determined intervals, as may be necessary. The 

committee should be appropriately supported by the Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Human Rights; 

(c) The Mission recommends that, upon receipt of the committee’s report, the 

Security Council should consider the situation and, in the absence of good-faith 

investigations that are independent and in conformity with international standards having 

been undertaken or being under way within six months of the date of its resolution under 

Article 40 by the appropriate authorities of the State of Israel, again acting under Chapter 

VII of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of 

the International Criminal Court pursuant to article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute; 

(d) The Mission recommends that the Security Council should require the 

independent committee of experts referred to in subparagraph (b) to monitor and report 

on any domestic legal or other proceedings undertaken by the relevant authorities in the 

Gaza Strip in relation to the aforesaid investigations. The committee should report at the 

end of the six-month period to the Security Council on its assessment of relevant domestic 

proceedings initiated by the relevant authorities in Gaza, including their progress, 

effectiveness and genuineness, so that the Security Council may assess whether appropriate 

action to ensure justice for victims and accountability for perpetrators has been taken or is 

being taken at the domestic level. The Security Council should request the committee to 

report to it at determined intervals, as may be necessary;  

(e) The Mission recommends that, upon receipt of the committee’s report, the 

Security Council should consider the situation and, in the absence of good-faith 

investigations that are independent and in conformity with international standards having 

been undertaken or being under way within six months of the date of its resolution under 

Article 40 by the appropriate authorities in Gaza, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter 

of the United Nations, refer the situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of the International 

Criminal Court pursuant to article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute; 

(f) The Mission recommends that lack of cooperation by the Government of Israel 

or the Gaza authorities with the work of the committee should be regarded by the Security 

Council to be obstruction of the work of the committee. 

1970. To the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, with reference to the 

declaration under article 12 (3) received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the 

International Criminal Court from the Government of Palestine, the Mission considers 

that accountability for victims and the interests of peace and justice in the region require 

that the Prosecutor should make the required legal determination as expeditiously as 

possible.  

1971. To the General Assembly, 

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(a) The Mission recommends that the General Assembly should request the 

Security Council to report to it on measures taken with regard to ensuring accountability 

for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights in relation to the 

facts in this report and any other relevant facts in the context of the military operations in 

Gaza, including the implementation of the Mission’s recommendations. The General 

Assembly may remain appraised of the matter until it is satisfied that appropriate action is 

taken at the domestic or international level in order to ensure justice for victims and 

accountability for perpetrators. The General Assembly may consider whether additional 

action within its powers is required in the interests of justice, including under its resolution 

377 (V) on uniting for peace; 

(b) The Mission recommends that the General Assembly should establish an 

escrow fund to be used to pay adequate compensation to Palestinians who have suffered 

loss and damage as a result of unlawful acts attributable to Israel during the December– 

January military operation and actions in connection with it, and that the Government of 

Israel should pay the required amounts into such fund. The Mission further recommends 

that the General Assembly should ask the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Human Rights to provide expert advice on the appropriate modalities to establish the 

escrow fund; 

(c) The Mission recommends that the General Assembly should ask the 

Government of Switzerland to convene a conference of the high contracting parties to the 

Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 on measures to enforce the Convention in the Occupied 

Palestinian Territory and to ensure its respect in accordance with its article 1;  

(d) The Mission recommends that the General Assembly should promote an urgent 

discussion on the future legality of the use of certain munitions referred to in this report, 

and in particular white phosphorous, flechettes and heavy metal such as tungsten. In such 

discussion the General Assembly should draw inter alia on the expertise of the 

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Mission further recommends that 

the Government of Israel should undertake a moratorium on the use of such weapons in 

the light of the human suffering and damage they have caused in the Gaza Strip. 

1972. To the State of Israel,  

(a) The Mission recommends that Israel should immediately cease the border 

closures and restrictions on passage through border crossings with the Gaza Strip and 

allow the passage of goods necessary and sufficient to meet the needs of the population, for 

the recovery and reconstruction of housing and essential services, and for the resumption 

of meaningful economic activity in the Gaza Strip; 

(b) The Mission recommends that Israel should cease the restrictions on access to 

the sea for fishing purposes imposed on the Gaza Strip and allow such fishing activities 

within the 20 nautical miles as provided for in the Oslo Accords. It further recommends 

that Israel should allow the resumption of agricultural activity within the Gaza Strip, 

including within areas in the vicinity of the borders with Israel;  

A/HRC/12/48 

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(c) Israel should initiate a review of the rules of engagement, standard operating 

procedures, open fire regulations and other guidance for military and security personnel. 

The Mission recommends that Israel should avail itself of the expertise of the International 

Committee of the Red Cross, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Human Rights and other relevant bodies, and Israeli experts, civil society organizations 

with the relevant expertise and specialization, in order to ensure compliance in this respect 

with international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In particular 

such rules of engagement should ensure that the principles of proportionality, distinction, 

precaution and non-discrimination are effectively integrated in all such guidance and in 

any oral briefings provided to officers, soldiers and security forces, so as to avoid the 

recurrence of Palestinian civilian deaths, destruction and affronts on human dignity in 

violation of international law;  

(d) The Mission recommends that Israel should allow freedom of movement for 

Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory - within the West Bank, including 

East Jerusalem, between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and between the Occupied 

Palestinian Territory and the outside world - in accordance with international human 

rights standards and international commitments entered into by Israel and the 

representatives of the Palestinian people. The Mission further recommends that Israel 

should forthwith lift travel bans currently placed on Palestinians by reason of their human 

rights or political activities; 

(e) The Mission recommends that Israel should release Palestinians who are 

detained in Israeli prisons in connection with the occupation. The release of children 

should be an utmost priority. The Mission further recommends that Israel should cease the 

discriminatory treatment of Palestinian detainees. Family visits for prisoners from Gaza 

should resume;   

(f) The Mission recommends that Israel should forthwith cease interference with 

national political processes in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and as a first step release 

all members of the Palestinian Legislative Council currently in detention and allow all 

members of the Council to move between Gaza and the West Bank so that it may resume 

functioning;  

(g) The Mission recommends that the Government of Israel should cease actions 

aimed at limiting the expression of criticism by civil society and members of the public 

concerning Israel’s policies and conduct during the military operations in the Gaza Strip. 

The Mission also recommends that Israel should set up an independent inquiry to assess 

whether the treatment by Israeli judicial authorities of Palestinian and Jewish Israelis 

expressing dissent in connection with the offensive was discriminatory, in terms of both 

charges and detention pending trial. The results of the inquiry should be made public and, 

subject to the findings, appropriate remedial action should be taken; 

(h) The Mission recommends that the Government of Israel should refrain from 

any action of reprisal against Palestinian and Israeli individuals and organizations that 

have cooperated with the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, in 

particular individuals who have appeared at the public hearings held by the Mission in 

Gaza and Geneva and expressed criticism of actions by Israel;   

  A/HRC/12/48 

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(i) The Mission recommends that Israel should reiterate its commitment to 

respecting the inviolability of United Nations premises and personnel and that it should 

undertake all appropriate measures to ensure that there is no repetition of violations in the 

future. It further recommends that reparation to the United Nations should be provided 

fully and without further delay by Israel, and that the General Assembly should consider 

this matter.  

1973. To Palestinian armed groups, 

(a) The Mission recommends that Palestinian armed groups should undertake 

forthwith to respect international humanitarian law, in particular by renouncing attacks 

on Israeli civilians and civilian objects, and take all feasible precautionary measures to 

avoid harm to Palestinian civilians during hostilities; 

(b) The Mission recommends that Palestinian armed groups who hold Israeli 

soldier Gilad Shalit in detention should release him on humanitarian grounds. Pending 

such release they should recognize his status as prisoner of war, treat him as such, and 

allow him ICRC visits.   

1974. To responsible Palestinian authorities,  

(a) The Mission recommends that the Palestinian Authority should issue clear 

instructions to security forces under its command to abide by human rights norms as 

enshrined in the Palestinian Basic Law and international instruments, ensure prompt and 

independent investigation of all allegations of serious human rights violations by security 

forces under its control, and end resort to military justice to deal with cases involving 

civilians; 

(b) The Mission recommends that the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza 

authorities should release without delay all political detainees currently in their power and 

refrain from further arrests on political grounds and in violation of international human 

rights law; 

(c) The Mission recommends that the Palestinian Authority and the Gaza 

authorities should continue to enable the free and independent operation of Palestinian 

non-governmental organizations, including human rights organizations, and of the 

Independent Commission for Human Rights. 

1975. To the international community, 

(a) The Mission recommends that the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 

1949 should start criminal investigations in national courts, using universal jurisdiction, 

where there is sufficient evidence of the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva 

Conventions of 1949. Where so warranted following investigation, alleged perpetrators 

should be arrested and prosecuted in accordance with internationally recognized standards 

of justice; 

A/HRC/12/48 

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(b) International aid providers should step up financial and technical assistance 

for organizations providing psychological support and mental health services to the 

Palestinian population;  

(c) In view of their crucial function, the Mission recommends that donor 

countries/assistance providers should continue to support the work of Palestinian and 

Israeli human rights organizations in documenting and publicly reporting on violations of 

human rights and international humanitarian law, and advising relevant authorities on 

their compliance with international law; 

(d) The Mission recommends that States involved in peace negotiations between 

Israel and representatives of the Palestinian people, especially the Quartet, should ensure 

that respect for the rule of law, international law and human rights assumes a central role 

in internationally sponsored peace initiatives;   

(e) In view of the allegations and reports about long-term environmental damage 

that may have been created by certain munitions or debris from munitions, the Mission 

recommends that a programme of environmental monitoring should take place under the 

auspices of the United Nations, for as long as deemed necessary. The programme should 

include the Gaza Strip and areas within southern Israel close to impact sites. The 

environmental monitoring programme should be in accordance with the recommendations 

of an independent body, and samples and analyses should be analysed by one or more 

independent expert institutions. Such recommendations, at least at the outset, should 

include measurement mechanisms which address the fears of the population of Gaza and 

southern Israel at this time and should at a minimum be in a position to determine the 

presences of heavy metals of all varieties, white phosphorous, tungsten micro-shrapnel and 

granules and such other chemicals as may be revealed by the investigation.  

1976. To the international community and responsible Palestinian authorities, 

(a) The Mission recommends that appropriate mechanisms should be established 

to ensure that the funds pledged by international donors for reconstruction activities in the 

Gaza Strip are smoothly and efficiently disbursed, and urgently put to use for the benefit of 

the population of Gaza; 

(b) In view of the consequences of the military operations, the Mission 

recommends that responsible Palestinian authorities as well as international aid providers 

should pay special attention to the needs of persons with disabilities. In addition, the 

Mission recommends that medical follow-up should be ensured by relevant international 

and Palestinian structures with regard to patients who suffered amputations or were 

otherwise injured by munitions, the nature of which has not been clarified, in order to 

monitor any possible long-term impact on their health. Financial and technical assistance 

should be provided to ensure adequate medical follow-up to Palestinian patients. 

1977. To the international community, Israel and Palestinian authorities, 

(a) The Mission recommends that Israel and representatives of the Palestinian 

people, and international actors involved in the peace process, should involve Israeli and 

  A/HRC/12/48 

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Palestinian civil society in devising sustainable peace agreements based on respect for 

international law. The participation of women should be ensured in accordance with 

Security Council resolution 1325 (2000);  

(b) The Mission recommends that attention should be given to the position of 

women and steps be taken to ensure their access to compensation, legal assistance and 

economic security. 

1978. To the United Nations Secretary-General, the Mission recommends that the 

Secretary-General should develop a policy to integrate human rights in peace initiatives in 

which the United Nations is involved, especially the Quartet, and request the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to provide the expertise required to 

implement this recommendation. 

1979. To the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,  

(a) The Mission recommends that the Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Human Rights should monitor the situation of persons who have 

cooperated with the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict and 

periodically update the Human Rights Council through its public reports and in other ways 

as it may deem appropriate; 

(b) The Mission recommends that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 

Rights should give attention to the Mission’s recommendations in its periodic reporting on 

the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the Human Rights Council.